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In sports of human endurance, the role of equipment and technology, and how to 
regulate it, has long been contested. In the 1980's the advent of carbon fiber bicycle 
frames shook the world of professional cycling, and the sport chose to accept, rather than 
outlaw, the arms race of innovation that followed. In swimming, polyurethane and 
neoprene full-body suits changed the landscape, and the look, of the sport in the 2008 
Beijing Olympics; in contrast to the cycling tech, those suits were shortly thereafter 
banned. In running, the arrival of the Nike Vaporfly 4% shoes in July of 2017 has 
sparked equal levels of scrutiny. As of now, the shoes that claim to improve marathon 
performance by 4% have not been banned, and have subsequently sparked an arms race 
among shoe companies never before seen in the sport.  
The question, however, of whether or not the shoes should be allowed in 
professional marathon contests, remains. While they were initially approved for usage by 
the International Olympic Committee, the postponement of the 2020 Tokyo Games to the 
summer of 2021 has re-opened the case. The concern is that, all else equal, these shoes 
create uneven grounds for competition in a sport that should be won or lost not by 
technology, but by the fastest person on a given day.  
Nike’s central claim surrounding these shoes is that the shoes can make athletes 
“four percent more efficient than Nike’s previous fastest marathon shoe,” according to 
their July 17, 2017 press release regarding the shoes (Nike News 2017). Many simplify 
this quantification of the shoes’ effect to mean that the shoes will make a runner 4% 
faster than they would be in any other shoes, given Nike’s position atop the world of 
running shoe technology.  
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Figure 1: The Nike Vaporfly 4%’s in the July 2017 Press Release 
 
Source: Nike News 
The shoes were designed specifically for distances of half marathon and marathon, and 
are meant to be worn while racing on roads. In that same 2017 press release, Nike backs 
up these claims with the key technological features of the shoes: the shoe “pairs a Nike 
ZoomX midsole (for responsive cushioning) with a full-length carbon plate (intended to 
minimize energy loss during toe bend without increasing demand for the calf)”. The 
company claims that the carbon fiber plate acts as a spring by improving a runner’s foot 
strike and then by creating leverage to propel runners forward with less effort. 
Meanwhile, the patented React foam lines the bottom of the shoe to help absorb the force 
of impact upon landing, thereby reducing the energy lost to impact with the ground. 
These highly engineered shoes are intended to provide highly engineered results. 
Since the release of the shoes in 2017, the arms race among shoe companies to 
create the greatest and fastest ‘super shoe’ has been intense. Nike has since released other 
iterations of the shoe, the latest being the Alphafly NEXT%, and continues to engineer 
new products that provide additional gains. Competitors, such as Hoka One One, New 
Balance, and Adidas, have all released shoes that leverage similar technology and make 
similar claims. While the shoes all leverage the same key piece of technology, a carbon 
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fiber plate in the midsole, each company tries to occupy a niche space in the running 
world. For example, Hoka One One’s shoe targets the marathon and longer, while New 
Balance’s shoe targets short road races, like a 5k. For all intents and purposes, this study 
treats all three iterations of Nike’s shoes (the Vaporfly 4%, the Vaporfly NEXT%, and 
the Alphafly NEXT%) the same, assuming minimal improvement in outcomes or 
mechanical variation between the three. 
Questions remain, still, surrounding the accuracy of Nike’s claim. These shoes 
may be highly engineered by a leading shoe manufacturer, tested in advanced sports 
science laboratories, and worn by the fastest professionals, but there is not strong 
evidence that these shoes actually improve performance by 4%, particularly for everyday 
runners. Nike’s claim has not been verified in the field because, on one hand, running a 
randomized control trial in the context of marathon running would take a long time and 
be quite costly. On the other hand, Nike’s professional runners are the fastest in the 
world, having set the recent world records in the marathon and half marathon while 
wearing the Vaporflys. In short, Nike is not compelled to show true evidence of 4% 
improvement in everyday runners, and they believe that people will buy into the 
excitement surrounding the shoes generated by Nike’s professional athletes and their 
performances while wearing the shoes. Thus, the onus is on users and other parties to test 
Nike’s claim and truly determine whether or not these shoes are worth the hype and 
recognition that they garner. This study sets out to test and evaluate their claim. 
The results of this study have implications not only for sport, but also for policy, 
and even econometrics. Most obviously, the implications of this study are enormous for 
the entire landscape of running. These shoes are the single largest innovation in the sport 
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since the invention of running spikes to be worn during track races. Since the release, a 
Nike athlete and Olympic champion, Eliud Kipchoge, became the first man to ever break 
2 hours in the marathon, a barrier previously thought of as insurmountable. Along with 
that historic performance, times have improved for professional marathon runners across 
the board. The world record in the marathon dropped by 78 seconds from 2:02:51 to 
2:01:39, a margin of decline more than double of any world record improvement in the 
modern era of running. The half marathon record has been improved a handful of times 
since the release of the shoes, and was most notably broken by four men in the same race 
at the Valencia Half Marathon in December of 2020. The athletics community wants to 
know: are these explosive changes happening because athletes are actually getting faster, 
or do the improvements rely entirely on the advancement in technology? 
For economists, the policy and econometric implications are even more 
meaningful than the athletic implications. The rulings that the World Athletics 
Association and the International Olympic Committee make with regard to these shoes 
will address the precedent for technology’s role in sport. Officials are forced to rule on 
the fairness of technology, and thereby must address once again how technology should 
impact a sport that relies so much on human endurance and performance, in the same way 
that rubber tracks and shoes with spikes were approved in times of cinder tracks and 
simple flats. To assess the fairness of using this technology, the officials need to 
determine if the shoes provide a measureable advantage over other shoes, and then assess 
whether or not that advantage should be allowed. These rulings are significant for the 
upcoming 2021 Tokyo Olympics and will set the precedent for other sports and for future 
technological advancements in running.  
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The econometric implications of the study are less obvious, but potentially even 
more interesting to many economists. Below the athletic and political surface of these 
shoes, lies one of an econometrician’s greatest challenges: How does one handle omitted 
variables and their biases? In determining the actual performance impact of these shoes, 
the Vaporfly effect, we will be forced to detangle that effect from fitness effects, which 
are inherently omitted and difficult to capture. This problem presents space for 
addressing omitted variable bias in both classical ways, through Instrumental Variables, 
and creative ways, through difference-in-difference techniques, among others. So, we 
ask: What extent of impact on the sport can be attributed to individual athletes’ fitness 


















Despite the recent release and limited usage of the shoes, there has been a flourish 
of literature surrounding the shoe technology, as many different groups weigh in on the 
shoes and their impact. The variety of different contexts of these studies reflects that the 
scope clearly extends beyond professional endurance sport: economists have studied the 
effects, legal groups have evaluated the policy outcomes, physiologists have analyzed the 
energetic costs associated with the shoes, and mainstream publications have presented 
Nike’s claim and subsequent skepticism to the general public. 
 
Popular Press 
In 2018, shortly after Nike’s release of the first iteration of the shoes, the New 
York Times published their own review of the shoes in their article titled “Nike Says Its 
$250 Shoe Will Make You Run Much Faster. What If That’s Actually True?”. The New 
York Times was the first mainstream publisher to put forth both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the shoes out to a mass audience, signaling the broad interest in 
the topic.  
In their analysis, the New York Times analyzed more than 500,000 individual race 
performances between 2014 and 2018 and found that the runners wearing Vaporflys ran, 
on average, 3-4% faster over the half marathon or marathon distance than categorically 
similar runners. In their study, they collected the race instances by collecting activity data 
from Strava, a social media platform on which users, or athletes, can upload exercise 
activities. Each race instance included a variety of variables that they would later work 
into models, including duration, distance (half or full marathon), race course and race 
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year specific data, athlete-specific data, such as age and gender, and the shoes that the 
athlete was wearing. Depending on what athletes recorded in their Strava posts, not all 
activities, Strava’s term for a race instance, included all of these variables; most 
significantly, “in about one-third of the races on Strava, athletes reported data on the 
shoes that they wore” (Quealy 3). Nonetheless, with such a large dataset of over 500,000 
instances, incomplete data could be handled appropriately for complete analysis. 
With this data, the New York Times performed their analysis using four models:  
1. A statistical model 
2. An inter-athlete comparison model for different athletes of similar fitness  
3. An intra-athlete model for athletes that switched shoes between races 
4. A model that measured the likelihood of an athlete achieving a personal best 
when wearing the shoes 
Figure 2: High level results of the NYT’s 4 models 
 
Source: Katz & Quealy, NYT 
1. Starting with the statistical model, while the Times does not specifically lay out 
their model specifications in the article, they control for athlete-specific and race-
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specific factors to estimate how the shoes impact performance: “After controlling 
for all of these variables, our model estimates that the shoes account for an 
expected improvement of about 4 percent over a runner’s previous time” (Quealy 
4). The authors claim, although do not show, that their results do not change 
under a variety of model specifications, such as including or excluding athlete 
training data, using propensity score to determine the likelihood of wearing the 
shoes, or controlling for the weather on race day. While admitting that this model 
is potentially biased because it does not use randomized control trial data, Quealy 
and Katz put together a convincing argument for a Vaporfly effect by comparing 
the effect of the Vaporflys to the effect of other shoes, as shown graphically in 
Figure 3, below: 
Figure 3: Statistical Model 
 
Source: Katz & Quealy, NYT 
This figure demonstrates that, while other shoes might also boost performance 
over a baseline, the Vaporflys are the only shoes that live up to the promise of 
4%+ advantage over that baseline. 
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2. Next, the inter-athlete comparison model makes comparisons between similar 
athletes over time. The model takes groups of runners that ran the same marathons 
in the same years, and then looked at how runners that switched to the Vaporflys 
between races performed as compared to the athletes that did not make the shoe 
change. This model resembles a difference-in-difference approach, where one 
group acts as a control group between races, and another receives a treatment (ie, 
switching to the Vaporflys) between races. When looking at runners that ran the 
Boston marathon in both 2017 and 2018, those that switched to the Vaporflys in 
2018 generally performed better than the rest of the group, as demonstrated by 
this side by side graphical comparison: 
Figure 4: Inter-athlete Comparison Results 
 
Source: Katz & Quealy, NYT 
While the group of runners that made the switch in shoes between years is small, 
only 52 of 1,275 runners that ran Boston both years, the shift is dramatic. 
3. The intra-athlete model aggregated the effects of a switch to Vaporflys within 
individual athletes over time. This model took athletes who had uploaded at least 
5 marathons to Strava in the 2014-2018 time period and then tried to estimate how 
the switch to the Vaporflys affected their performance. By focusing on athletes 
with many races uploaded, this model attempts to more accurately capture the 
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natural improvements that most athletes see as a result of consistent training over 
time. Then, the model uses the race in which the athlete switches to the Vaporflys 
to estimate the shoes’ effect. The graphic below summarizes the results of not 
only the effect of a switch to Vaporflys, but also to other shoes: 
Figure 5: Intra-athlete Comparison Results 
 
Source: Katz & Quealy, NYT 
While this model focuses less on the effects of factors like course and weather, it 
still makes a convincing case for the improvement that the shoes provide, but at a 
magnitude lower than 4%. 
4. The final model seeks to display how likely runners were to run their fastest time, 
or personal best (PB), when they made the switch to the Vaporflys, as compared 
to other shoes. While the authors do not specify the other variables that went into 
this model, such as race day conditions or training leading up to a PB-
performance, the focus is on whether or not the Vaporflys were worn during these 
special performances. This model again focuses on how runners fared when the 
switched the Vaporflys in comparison to a switch to other shoes. Yet again, the 
results are convincing, with nearly 70% of the runners that switched setting a PB, 
as shown below in Figure 6: 
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Figure 6: Personal Best Probability Model 
 
Source: Katz & Quealy, NYT 
Of interest with these results, however, is the fact that a different shoe, the Nike 
Streak, actually accounted for a slightly higher probability of running a personal 
best when switching to those shoes. It is possible that this trend reflects the fact 
that the Nike Streak is a more accessible, and thus more widely used, shoe, 
whereas the Vaporflys’ $250 price tag puts them out of reach for many. 
Nonetheless, the case for the Vaporflys is strengthened.  
As the New York Times’ varied analyses suggest, the Vaporflys seem to have 
some effect. However, by their own admission, there are still plenty of shortcomings to 
the analysis that make the actual magnitude of the effect under suspect. The analysis 
failed to control for many potential forms of bias:  
 The most significant omission is likely their lack of quantification of any fitness 
effect, or the effect of a change in fitness between races. While there are methods 
in place that might handle that fitness effect in the inter-athlete and intra-athlete 
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models, Quealy and Katz do not outright address the existence of this omitted 
variable in any of their analysis.  
 Other missed biases include self-selection bias and reporting bias, where athletes 
that are poised to run fast decided to wear the shoes, and athletes that ran well 
decided to report their performance, respectively.  
The authors openly admit that their models are susceptible to these types of biases, 
making their estimates less certain. Despite these holes in their analysis, the New York 
Times still presents a compelling case for a Vaporfly effect existing in some form.  
 
An Econometric Analysis 
In “An Observational Study of the Effects of Nike Vaporfly on Marathon 
Performance,” Guiness et. al. took a narrower, but more sophisticated, approach to 
analyze the Vaporfly effect. Instead of focusing on a broad spectrum of runners, this 
study from Cornell University systematically selected professional and semi-professional 
athletes’ performances from 2015-2019, a window spanning evenly from the two years 
before the release of the shoes and two years after the release of the shoes. The study 
referenced Quealy and Katz’s work with the New York Times, and intentionally focused 
on elite and sub-elite marathoners instead of the general running population for expressed 
reasons: 
 They wanted to focus on the subsection of runners for whom the impending 
regulations had the greatest impact.  
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 They wanted to focus on runners who had proven themselves to have run fast 
marathons, defined by a minimum time cutoff, before wearing the Vaporflys in an 
attempt to control more effectively for fitness of athlete-specific effects.  
 They avoided some selection bias by collecting “an exhaustive sample of athletes 
who met a minimum performance standard at one of 22 of the largest marathon 
venues in 2015 and 2016,” instead of the self-reported Strava data used by Katz 
and Quealy (Guinness 2).   
In controlling for athlete ability and race conditions, the group found 90% confidence 
intervals of 1.4%-2.8% improvement in times for male athletes and 0.6%-2.2% 
improvement in times for females.  
The study collected race data from major US and Canadian marathons in 2015 
and 2016 to capture the pre-Vaporfly results, and results from marathons in 2017, 2018 
and 2019 for results that included Vaporflys (see Appendix). Adoption was not 
immediate, nor was it universal, as one would expect with any new technology.  
Figure 7: Adoption of Vaporflys over Dataset Timeframe 
 
Source: Guinness et. al. 
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The above graph demonstrates that adoption was low starting in 2017, and gradually rose 
over the course of the subsequent years. Each circle represents a race, with the size of the 
circle corresponding to the number of athletes that met researchers’ selection criteria in 
that race. The vertical position of the circle shows the proportion of runners in the given 
race wearing the Vaporflys. The plot demonstrates steady adoption of the shoes, starting 
low and passing an average of 50% adoption of the shoes by 2019. In this study, men and 
women were split into different groups for the purpose of analysis, so as to account for 
any differences in how the shoes impacted the sexes physiologically differently. These 
physiological differences can be attributed to mechanical differences in the typical strides 
of male and female runners, as well as height and weight differences. 
 In their analysis, Guinness et. al. used a relatively simple fixed effect statistical 
model of the performances, as follows: 




Source: Guinness et. al. 
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In short, the parameter of interest, or the Vaporfly effect, is measured by b1, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable, xi, which is a Boolean representation of whether or not 
Vaporflys are worn. Each runner has its own offset term, Uj(i), to account for varying 
athlete abilities, each course has an offset term, Vk(i), to account for differences in course 
variation, each individual race has an offset term, Wl(i), to account for differences between 
the same races from year to year, and each instance in the dataset has a term, Zi, to 
account for any other residual effects. They used R’s lmer package, or the linear mixed 
effects, to fit their model to the given parameters. The results were promising, showing 
significant time reduction effects from the use of Vaporflys: 
Figure 9: Guinnes et. al. Results Table 
 
Source: Guinness et. al. 
As the output shows, wearing the Vaporflys was shown to be associated with almost a 3-
minute improvement for men, and just over 2-minute improvement for women, a 2.09%-
time reduction and 1.35%-time reduction, respectively. While these estimates do not 
match the 4% claim from Nike, they still promise a significant advantage.  
 In his analysis, Guinness opens himself up to critiques in his approach: 
 The biggest critiques come from the assumptions that were made in building the 
statistical model. One major assumption is that the shoes affect all runners of the 
same sex equally. Two key threats to this assumption would be, first, that this 
does not account for biomechanical differences between athletes of the same sex, 
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and, second, that the newer iterations of the shoes, while not distinguished in the 
study, could also affect runners differently.  
 Additionally, the model assumes that, in any given race, times run follow a 
normal distribution, when in reality it is much “more likely to run 5 minutes 
slower than expected rather than 5 minutes faster; when things go wrong in a 
marathon, they can go really wrong” (Guinness 8).  
 Finally, other minor concerns include that this model does not account for runners 
who did not finish their races, along with the fact that the shoes had to be 
manually identified in pictures, leaving room for human error.  
Otherwise, this study puts forth another convincing argument in favor of a Vaporfly 
effect of 1.4%-2.1%.  
 
A Physiological Analysis 
In the discussion of the physiological reasoning behind the improvements, 
Guinness et. al.’s paper references Hoogakamer et. al.’s 2018 laboratory study, “A 
Comparison of the Energetic Cost of Running in Marathon Racing Shoes.” That study 
focuses more specifically on the physiological effects of the shoes by studying 18 “high 
caliber athletes [running] six 5-min trials” in a laboratory environment (Hoogakamer 
1009). The trial calculates the Vaporfly effect in the form of change in energetic cost, 
measured in watts per kilogram, when an athlete switches from two other premier 
marathon shoes to the Vaporflys. This study found that the Vaporflys “lowered energetic 
cost of running by 4% on average” (Hoogakamer 1009). While a reduction in energetic 
costs is not exactly translatable to a time reduction in a race, the estimate sticks as Nike’s 
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metric of improvement due to the shoes. The most notable outcome from this study was 
how strongly it endorsed Nike’s claim of a 4% improvement; the paper goes further to 
predict that an athlete will soon achieve the sub-2-hour marathon while wearing the 
shoes, which happened shortly after conclusion of the study. It is worth noting in 
evaluating these findings that this University of Colorado study was funded by Nike, 
clearly reflecting their desire to prove the shoes’ effectiveness to runners and scientists 
alike. 
The paper starts by asserting that three physiological parameters generally decide 
how long a certain velocity, or pace, can be sustained while running: runner’s maximal 
rate of oxygen uptake, their lactate threshold, and their energetic cost of running. The 
primary assumption of the study is that runners of similar levels, particularly at the 
professional or elite level, have similar lactate threshold levels and oxygen uptake rates. 
Thus, running economy, or efficiency, which then determines how long a certain pace 
can be held for that athlete, can be expressed by way of energetic cost at that certain pace, 
measured in Watts per Kilogram (W/Kg). Following the simple math in this three-part 
equation of lactate threshold, oxygen uptake and energetic costs, low energetic costs 
athletes outperform high energetic cost athletes when the other two factors are assumed 
to be effectively the same. Thus, “if an athlete can lower their energetic cost to run at a 
specified velocity, then they should be able to run faster with their existing physiological 
capacities” (Hoogakamer 1010). As such, the study seeks to evaluate whether or not 
Nike’s shoes lower energetic costs more than their alternatives. 
A variety of factors influence the energetic cost associated with certain pairs of 
shoes, including shoe weight, shoe cushion and shoe stiffness or springiness. All of these 
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factors are logical influencers of energetic costs; lighter shoes require less energy to 
move, more cushioned shoes reduce the energetic cost placed on the feet and lower legs 
when striking the ground, and springier shoes reduce the cost of physically moving 
forward. Shoe cushioning has been a major focus of shoe manufacturers for years. The 
goal of such focus is to create lightweight foam to be placed in the midsole that is both 
compliant, in that it reduces the energetic cost of impact, and resilient, in that it can store 
and return mechanical energy associated with foot strike. Shoe companies have made 
large improvements in this area over the last 20 years in their development of 
lightweight, highly resilient midsole foam, recently “shown to reduce the energetic cost 
of running by ~1%” (Hoogakamer 1010). These improvements, while not as striking as a 
4-5% improvement, are significant. 
The new breed of ‘super shoes’ goes a step further in its attempt to enhance the 
mechanical energy saved by running shoes by adding a plate in between layers of foam 
within the midsole, as shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Vaporfly Sole Diagram 
 
Source: Hoogakamer et. al. 
This midsole carbon-fiber plate acts as a spring, helping runners propel into their next 
stride following contact with the ground. These plates have also been shown to reduce the 
energetic cost of running by around 1% according to the researchers in this study. Thus, 
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combined with resilient foam and incredibly light upper mesh covering the top of the 
shoe, Nike has created shoes that they believe significantly decrease the energetic costs of 
running.  
To test that belief, Hoogakamer et. al. tested in a lab the Vaporflys against Nike’s 
Zoom Streak 6, formerly their standard marathon racing shoe, and the Adidas Adizero 
Adios BOOST 2, the shoes worn by Dennis Kimmetto in his September 2014 world 
record performance. For reference, the New York Times study found that runners were 
more likely to set a personal best in the Nike Zoom Streak than any other running shoe, 
including the Vaporflys. Prior to any athlete being tested in the shoes, the shoes 
underwent mechanical tests by way of lab technology that could measure mechanical 
energy storage and return. Combining the results of compliance and resilience tests, the 
Vaporflys were found to return twice the amount of mechanical energy than either of the 
other shoes, a huge improvement. Following the mechanical tests, tests on human 
subjects were performed. To make the tests as even as possible, 18 high-caliber, male 
runners all with very similar physical features and running performance were selected for 
analysis. The runners visited the lab for testing a total of 4 times each, each time running 
six 5-minute segments, two at 14 km/h, two at 16 km/h, and two at 18 km/h. The first lab 
test set a baseline in their own shoes, and then the subsequent three lab visits featured one 
of the three test shoes.  
By controlling for a variety of different variables and recording others, such as the 
lactate threshold during the 5-minute repetitions, the scientists were able to measure the 
average energetic cost associated with running in each shoe through a series of advanced 
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sensors and tests placed on the treadmill and on the athlete during the experiment. Results 
are graphically depicted in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Energetic Cost Differences 
 
Source: Hoogakamer et. al. 
At each speed, the Vaporflys (NP) demonstrate energetic cost lower than the other two 
pairs of shoes, the Nike Streaks (NS) and Adidas Boosts (AB). These differences reflect 
an average energetic cost 4.01% lower than the other two shoes, thus validating Nike’s 
4% claim. In the context of the marathon, that 4.01% reduction in energetic cost “should 
translate to ~3.4% improvement in running velocity at marathon world record pace … 
and not since 1952 has the men’s marathon record been broken by more than 3.4% in one 
race” (Hoogakamer 1016). As a result, this study clearly demonstrates how revolutionary 
these shoes are for the sport. 
 
Regulatory Analysis 
Finally, two further pieces of literature give a snapshot of the regulatory 
implications of the results found in the aforementioned studies as well as the proposed 
work of this study. First, in Dyer’s “A Pragmatic Approach to Resolving Technological 
Unfairness: the Case of Nike’s Vaporfly and Alphafly Running Footwear” and then in 
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O’Grady & Gracey’s “An Evaluation of the Decision by World Athletics on Whether or 
Not to Ban the Nike Vapor Fly Racing Shoe in 2020,” medical and legal scholars, 
respectively, give insight as to why the World Athletics Association continues to allow 
this new technology in professional running, and propose practical ways of formulating 
future rulings. In short, both articles recognize that there is mounting evidence that the 
Vaporfly effect does exist to some degree. However, as information currently stands, 
there is not enough evidence to suggest that these shoes provide an unfair advantage or 
encourage coercive behavior on behalf of athletes’ sponsors.  
Dyer’s analysis of the Vaporfly effect takes a look at the question of unfairness as 
a result of the shoes’ effect. In his analysis, Dyer takes a pragmatic approach, which, in 
the context of sport, attempts to evaluate whether or not the use of the technology is in 
the best interest of the sports’ future. Figure 12 lists the evaluation criteria: 
Figure 12: Pragmatic Analysis Criteria 
 
Source: Dyer et. al. 
These criteria provided the basis for the study’s core research questions, the outcomes to 
which would be suitable for sports stakeholders to act upon. Using those criteria, the 
questions that Dyer goes on to pose and answer pragmatically took form similar to the 
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following: “Are the Nike Vaporfly/Alphafly shoes harmful to the health of the athlete 
using them?... Does the use of the Nike Vaporfly/Alphafly shoes affect the integrity of 
the sport or provide an advantage over the sport itself?... Are the Nike Vaporfly/Alphafly 
shoes inaccessible to some athletes?” (Dyer 3). Some of these questions, such as the 
questions relating to the criterion of unnaturalness or athlete harm require only brief 
explanations: all shoes would be considered unnatural, but they have been widely 
accepted in the sport for over 100 years, and these shoes show no evidence of athlete 
harm. These outcomes do not object to the continued use of this shoe technology. 
However, the questions relating to the unfairness of the technology and the equal access 
to it required much lengthier explanations. 
 Dyer does not question whether or not the shoes provide a mechanical advantage 
in comparison to other shoes. Referencing Hoogkamer’s paper, Dyer notes that the shoes 
are shown to have clear reductions in energetic costs, which would undoubtedly 
contribute to an advantage. The existence of an advantage is deemed passable because of 
the wide variation of shoes and technology that already exist and are allowed in the sport. 
Dyer does not justify this variation in terms of any statistical measure of outcome 
variance. Thus, unfairness of the technology is determined not by the existence of an 
advantage, but the magnitude thereof. In order to assess the fairness of that magnitude 
from a pragmatic perspective, Dyer relies on the performance improvement index (PII), a 
measure “developed to demonstrate unusual leaps in performance that could then 
retrospectively be attributed to technological change” (Dyer 4). The PII is calculated with 
a relatively simple formula: [(t1/t2)2 – 1] * 100, where t1 is a first performance divided 
by t2, a second performance, in order to demonstrate the magnitude of change between 
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the two. Dyer concludes his argument by stating that there is a common misconception 
that the world records in the marathon and half marathon made unusual jumps with the 
advent of these shoes, and backs up his claim with the following table summarizing PII 
changes: 
Figure 13: PII Changes 
 
Source: Dyer et. al. 
In short, Dyer uses these measures to argue that the record-breaking performances in 
these shoes did not present any abnormal changes in performance, and improvements in 
footwear and running surfaces have been happening all along. Thus, Dyer claims that the 
Vaporfly effect does not present an unusual outcome, and that the playing field of 
running technology has never truly been level. These are strong claims for shoes that 
would produce the first sub-2-hour marathon and a slew of world records almost instantly 
after being released. 
 Many of the other criteria, such as coercion, reskilling, dehumanization, cost and 
‘spirit of the sport,’ are quickly moved through, as the Vaporflys are easily deemed 
passable just as any other new pair of shoes would. The next key dilemma comes with the 
criterion of accessibility. Because many pros are sponsored by specific brands, the shoes 
available to them are often limited. As a result, an athlete sponsored by New Balance or 
Hoka One One would not be able to wear Nike’s Vaporfly shoes. Dyer references cases 
in other sports, such as swimming and cycling, that faced similar accessibility challenges 
posed by athletes’ sponsors. Some of these cases ended in bans, while others not, 
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depending on the scenario. The belief that Nike’s creation of this shoe will result in other 
brands matching the product with their own versions of a ‘super shoe’ provides evidence 
against a ban, while the enforcement of intellectual property rights or the inability of 
other brands to compete would encourage the ban. However, while the Nike-specific 
technology will not be available to other brands’ athletes, the core principles of the 
technology can certainly be implemented by other brands, thereby debunking this 
concern of accessibility. Ultimately, the framework used to evaluate the Vaporflys finds 
seven points in favor of continued use of the technology and three points of contention. 
As a result, Dyer’s primary recommendation, from a pragmatic perspective, is to continue 
to allow the shoes to be worn, but with continued vigilance and willingness to revisit the 
regulations. Mainstream media companies such as NPR and ABC have turned to Dyer for 
opinions on the shoes, yet his ultimate judgement avoids setting a firm stance. 
 Because of the mounting evidence that the Vaporflys did indeed have some effect 
on racing outcomes, the World Athletics Association (WAA) had been drafting some 
legislation since October of 2019 to address any unfairness that the shoes may cause in 
the sport. In O’Grady and Gracey’s “An Evaluation of the Decision by World Athletics 
on Whether or Not to Ban the Nike Vapor Fly Racing Shoe in 2020,” the authors take a 
look at how the WAA went about that decision making process. The delay between the 
release of the shoes in 2017 and the decision from the WAA is notable, as races needed to 
be run and studies need to be conducted for the WAA to determine whether the shoes 
actually made a difference in performance. After Eliud Kipchoge’s 2019 1:59:41 
marathon performance, among other stellar performances by athletes wearing the shoes, 
and multiple studies produced suggesting the shoes truly did create a near 4% advantage 
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in competition, the WAA was led to begin the evaluation process. Kipchoge set the 
official marathon world record in the shoes in September 2018, running 2:01:39 at Berlin, 
and Brigid Kosgei took down Paula Radcliffe’s longstanding world record by running 
2:14:04 in Vaporflys the 2019 Chicago Marathon. The women’s half marathon world 
record has been crushed twice by athletes wearing the shoes since their release: first by 
Ababel Yeshaneh in February 2020, running 1:04:31, and then by Ruth Chepngetich in 
April 2021, running 1:04:01. The studies by teams like Hoogakamer et. al. from the 
University of Colorado as well as the New York Times team have only further confirmed 
the power of the shoes in the public forum. Then, that evaluation process could not 
simply consist of handing down a binary banning ruling on the shoes, but had to be 
specific about which features and specifications of the shoes would not be permitted in 
the sport. Thus, this proceeding was no simple process.  
 The WAA’s evaluation of the legality of the Vaporflys in sport was modularized 
into multiple parts. First, the WAA sought to determine if the shoes provided a 
mechanical advantage over other shoes that would be fundamentally unfair. Gracey and 
O’Grady compare this analysis to the cases of the Speedo LZR Racer swimsuit, which 
was ultimately banned by the swimming governing body, and the case of the clap skates 
worn by speed skaters, which was ultimately banned at the short track level but not at the 
long track level. The key distinction between these two rulings had to do with how the 
mechanics of the technology affected the racer. In short, in cases where the technology 
affected the external racing environment, a ban was deemed necessary, while cases in 
which the technology only affected the athlete wearing it did not receive a ban. Thus, the 
swimsuit was banned while the skates were not.  
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The WAA considered the case of the Vaporflys in this context: Do the Vaporflys 
change the race, or change the racer? As discussed in Hoogkamer’s paper, the shoes 
clearly do change the biomechanics and energetic costs of an individual racer, but do not 
manipulate the external environment that the athlete is participating in. So, while the 
WAA recognizes that a mechanical advantage is present in the Vaporflys, they do not 
find that advantage worthy of banning, as other shoe companies are able to compete with 
this technology. Nonetheless, in order to address the mechanical advantage, the WAA did 
modify Rule 5 of Book C in their Constitution and Book of Rules to limit the effect that 
the mechanical advantage would provide. The rule was modified as follows: “‘the sole 
must be no thicker than 40 mm’ and ‘the shoe must not contain more than one rigid 
embedded plate or blade (of any material) that runs either the full length or only part of 
the length of the shoe. The plate may be in more than one part but those parts must be 
located sequentially in one plane (not stacked or in parallel) and must not overlap’” 
(O’Grady 3). The Vaporflys very narrowly meet these criteria, and are thus deemed 
passable. This modification sought to make more clear to shoe manufacturers the limits 
of the innovation that they could make in their technology moving forward. 
 Next, the WAA’s evaluation of the shoes focused on the universality of athletics. 
The basic premise of this universality is that the sport, and all advantages within it, 
should be reasonably accessible not only to all professional athletes, but all amateurs as 
well. That is to say that they should be available for purchase to all people, and should be 
reasonably accessible. While the price tag of $250 makes the shoes some of the most 
expensive in the sport, it was not considered inaccessible by the WAA. This question of 
accessibility also brings attention to the contracts that athletes have with different 
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sponsors that may hinder their access to the shoes. However, because it is believed that 
athletes sign these contracts at will, the WAA does not find these shoes inaccessible to 
athletes sponsored by shoe brands other than Nike because these athletes could 
theoretically switch to a Nike sponsorship or find sponsorship from other non-shoe 
brands. In order to definitively modify the ruling on accessibility, the WAA ruled to 
require any shoes worn in competition must be available for sale to the general public for 
at least four months prior to the competition. This marks a large shift in policy from the 
WAA, as athletes will no longer be able to compete in their sponsors’ prototype shoes. 
This ruling, however, was deemed sufficient by the WAA with regard to the universality 
of athletics. Now, one can expect to see both professionals and amateurs wearing the 
same shoes at the start of a marathon. 
O’Grady and Gracey’s recommendation to the World Athletics Association and 
other regulators is as follows moving forward: Keep a vigilant eye on the advancement of 
this technology, and reassess the ruling as often necessary. There are early signs that shoe 
companies, like Nike, are going to push the regulations passed down to the absolute limit, 
requiring vigilance on behalf of the governing body. While specific rules were modified, 
surely Nike and others will continue to innovate with other pieces of technology in the 
continued arms race of running shoe technology.  
With an improved understanding of the mechanics of the shoes as well as the 
controversy and rulings surrounding them, it seems that the Vaporflys have generated 
plenty of hype, if nothing else. Guinness et. al. and the New York Times’ team provide 
inspiration for how the shoes’ effect can be measured in the wild. Analysis of the effect 
they produce in actual races will be most telling.  
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Data & Methodology  
Introduction 
 
Analysis of real world race results is necessary to empirically evaluate Nike’s claim 
on a practical level. While Nike may have proven their claim mechanically in labs, 
testing the strength and responsiveness of their technology, those tests are irrelevant if the 
technology’s impact does not show up in real world data. To conduct this analysis, a two-
pronged approach will be taken: 
 First, Guinness et. al.’s “Observational Study of the Effects of Nike Vaporfly on 
Marathon Performance” is revisited. The goal of this first section is replication 
and, if possible, improvement. By replicating the study, we will have created a 
basis for further analysis and comparison; further, by including more recent data 
in the dataset used for Guinness’s study, the results of the study will be 
strengthened.  
 For the second analysis, publicly available Strava marathon data is collected and 
analyzed in a similar fashion to the New York Times’ analysis. While Guinness’ 
study focuses on professional runners, this second study hones in on the Vaporfly 
effect in the context of everyday amateurs. 
 
Guinness Replication 
Included in Guinness et. al.’s paper is a link to Joe Guinness’ GitHub repository, or 
online storage location for program scripts and files, which details the specific steps 
necessary to replicate the study. This convenient resource allows for speedy replication of 
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the study as well as clear opportunities for improvement on the study, most easily by way 
of expanding the dataset. The following work is grounded largely in the directions found 
in that repository, along with the analysis discussed in the paper, “An Observational 
Study of the Effects of Nike Vaporfly on Marathon Performance.” 
Data Needs 
As discussed in the literature review, the Guinness et. al. study takes a relatively 
simple approach in collecting and analyzing marathon data for their study. In short, 
Guinness et. al. takes a two-pronged approach to collect all of their data: 
 First, they use a Python script to scrape a website, marathonguide.com, for results 
from certain marathons that would qualify as ‘elite,’ or faster than 2:24 for men 
and faster than 2:45 for women. Prior to scraping the data, they compile a list of 
109 marathons that were reasonably competitive to collect their data from (see 
Appendix for full list of marathons).  
 Then, they analyze whether or not a runner was wearing the Vaporflys in a given 
race by manually inspecting race photos from each race and indicating whether or 
not the runner had the shoes on.  
After collecting the data as so, Guinness prepares the data for analysis through a series of 
cleaning steps, and then runs relatively simple regression analyses on the data. For their 
model specifications, they split the dataset to study men and women separately, and then 
run untransformed and log-transformed model specifications. They use a linear mixed 
model with fixed effects for the race, year, and individual athletes. Their findings are as 
follows in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9: Guinnes et. al. Results Table 
 
Source: Guinness et. al. 
So, while not as explosive as Nike’s 4% claim, Guinness et. al. find that the Vaporflys 
provided a ~2.1% improvement for men, and a ~1.4% improvement for women.  
 In order to replicate this work, the first requirement is to simply fork, or copy, Joe 
Guinness’ repository. This repository has some data already collected and stored in it, 
eliminating the need to repeat certain parts of the data collection process. For one, the 
data corresponding to the manual photo inspection is already completed and stored in the 
repository, saving the need to look through thousands of race photos. Results from one 
2020 marathon, the Marathon Project, will be added to the dataset, so some of this 
manual data collection is necessary, but minimally so. Additionally, the repository comes 
pre-loaded with data for assigning athletes unique identifiers, and a file containing 
matches for any misspellings of athlete’s names. For the remainder of the data necessary 
to replicate the analysis, the repository includes a file, reproduce.txt, with instructions on 
how to go about collecting and analyzing the data.  
 In order to understand the methods of data collection, first one must understand 
the data requirements for analysis. The dataset used for analysis is ultimately relatively 
simple; one instance of the dataset is composed of a result, or time for a given athlete’s 
performance at a race, the race at which the athlete competed and its year, the athlete’s 
name and unique identifier, the athlete’s gender, and a variable capturing whether or not 
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the athlete was wearing Vaporflys during the performance of not, given by a simple true 
or false. The majority of this data likely, and appropriately, sounds like a typical race 
results page that one might find at any given race: a table containing athlete name, time, 
gender, place and age. In order to collect that portion of the dataset, Guinness’ repository 
utilizes a Python script to scrape the data from a website that houses many such results 
pages, marathonguide.com, pictured as follows: 
Figure 14: Marathon Results Site 
 
Source: marathonguide.com 
The Python script takes advantage of two key packages, requests and BeautifulSoup, to 
scrape pages such as the one pictured above and stored them in clean CSV files for later 
analysis. The requests package automates the visiting of the 111 race results pages and 
grabs the HTML, and then BeautifulSoup package manipulates the HTML to collect the 
variables of interest on the page (all columns in Figure 14). Once collected, this data is 
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stored to be cleaned and analyzed later on. This scraping provides all of the athlete data 
besides whether or not the athlete was wearing Vaporflys in the race of interest. While 
that data is largely already collected by Guinness et. al., 2020 marathon results were 
manually collected. Coming from a variety of websites, race photos were similar to the 
below: 
Figure 15: Photos from the Marathon Project, December 2020 
  
Source: runnerspace.com photo gallery 
 After collecting all of the data in these two different formats, the data needs to be 
cleaned before analysis could begin. First, performances that are missing any of the data 
necessary for analysis are dropped from the dataset. Additionally, race times that do not 
meet the ‘elite’ criteria of qualifying for the US Olympic Team trials (2:45 for women, 
2:18 for men) are also dropped. The dataset scraped of race results from 
marathonguide.com is merged with the pre-existing dataset containing unique athlete 
identifiers, so that any name misspellings are avoided, and then finally that dataset is 
merged with the dataset of manually inspected photos based on the unique athlete 
identifiers and the race date to correctly indicate whether each individual performance 
was by an athlete wearing the Vaporflys or not. Figure 16 presents an extract from the 
final dataset: 
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Figure 16: Snippet of Cleaned Dataset 
 
Data Description 
This cleaned and merged dataset, split by gender, is comprised of 296 men who 
ran a total of 862 races, and 270 women who ran 778 races. The average time for men’s 
results in the dataset is 2:18:39, and the average women’s is 2:39:19. As Figure 17 
suggests, there does not appear to be any overall trends in athlete performance for men or 
women over time; that is to say that, for this dataset of athletes, men’s and women’s 
marathon times have not appeared to be generally getting faster or slower over time. 
Figure 17: Average Times by Course and Gender 
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Figure 17 displays the average women’s time in blue and average men’s time in black for 
each race, connected by a line to connect the same races for men and women. Out of the 
862 male results, 115 of those results were run in Vaporflys, making up 13.34% of the 
results. More interestingly, the percentage of the results in which Vaporflys were worn 
after the shoes became available in July 2017 was 36.39% for men, evidence of a large 
shift towards the shoes in the years after the release of the shoes. Similarly, of the 778 
women’s results, 85 were in Vaporflys, representing 10.93% of all results. Vaporflys 
were worn in the women’s results 26.81% of the time after they became available to 
runners in 2017, which, while still representing a large shift towards the shoes once they 
became available, was not as dramatic of a shift as for the men. This smaller shift on the 
women’s side could potentially be due to fewer of the elite female marathoners in the 
United States being sponsored by Nike, as other brands such as New Balance and Hoka 
One One have experienced greater success in attracting female athletes for sponsorships. 
That remains only a suggestion, though, as only a fraction of the runners in the dataset are 
professionally sponsored by shoe companies. Further, while the Vaporflys were released 
in July 2017, adoption was not immediate, as one would expect with any form of 
technology. Figure 18, a replication of the graph generated by Guinness et. al. in Figure 
7, demonstrates the adoption trends of the shoes for men and women: 
Figure 18: Replication of Guinness’ Adoption of Vaporflys over Time 
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This graph shows a trend of increasing adoption, as the proportion of athletes in any 
given race wearing the shoe appears to trend generally positively over time. This trend 
alone suggests that, even if the effect is not as strong as Nike advertises, athletes believe 
that the shoes do provide some advantage over other shoes; this is a notable shift among 
the athletes that depend on running shoe technology the most, as paychecks are on the 
line at many races for these elite runners.  
 Methodology & Approach 
 With data collected and cleaned, analysis could begin. Seeing as the goal of this 
analysis is to replicate the analysis that Joe Guinness used in his repository, the model 
specifications are limited to the models described in the paper by Guinness et. al. In short, 
Guinness employs a restricted maximum likelihood linear mixed model. A linear mixed 
model is used, as opposed to a simple linear regression model, in order to account for 
mixed effects, random or fixed. In this scenario, the primary areas of interest are the fixed 
effects presented within, first, distinct runners, and second, distinct courses in distinct 
years. The two specifications, one in normal form and the other in log form, are given 
below: 
Figure 19: Model Specifications 
 
Here, y represents time in minutes for a given performance, x1 represents the Vaporfly 
dummy variable (True or False, 1 or 0), f1 represents runner-specific fixed effects, and f2 
represents course (see Appendix) and year (2015-2019) specific fixed effects. While 
relatively simple, this model is powerful; by controlling for runner-specific fixed effects, 
the model attempts to control for a runner’s baseline performance level, while the year 
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and course-specific fixed effects attempt to control for a course’s difficulty as well as the 
conditions of the race in a given year. These fixed effects allow the model to strip away 
other key factors that influence runner performance, and subsequently hone in on the 




For the next section of analysis, the focus shifts from professional and elite 
athletes to amateur runners. Taking inspiration from the New York Times’ analysis of the 
Vaporfly effect, Strava is used for large quantities of publicly available marathon race 
data. Instead of limiting the races to competitive North American marathons, the six 
World Marathon Majors are used: Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, New York and 
Tokyo. Using results from 2014-2019, these races attract a wide variety of runners from 
across the world. In order to build a variety of models for analysis, most of the publicly 
available Strava activity data is collected from these races. A Strava activity is simply an 
upload record from an individual’s run. It includes, at the minimum, their time, distance, 
pace, course and elevation change. Runners can also choose to report their shoes and gear 
used during the activity on their post.  
First, data from Strava’s race pages is collected. Race pages, such as the one 
displayed in Figures 20 and 21, include tabulated results with the race course and date, 
athlete name and ID, age, gender, finish time and pace, and the athlete’s Strava activity 
title and ID. All of these fields provide valuable information for analysis and can be 
easily collected using program scripts to manipulate the underlying HTML. 
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Figure 20: 2019 Boston Marathon Race Page Header 
 
Source: strava.com/running_races 
Figure 21: Top 10 Results on Strava, 2019 Boston Marathon 
 
Source: strava.com/running_races 
Then, using the activity ID’s from a race page, it is possible to collect further information 
about athletes’ individual performances. This information includes heart rate and Strava’s 
suffer score data, a measure of exertion based on heart rate data, any information the 
athlete writes in the description box of the activity, and, most notably, what shoes the 
runner was wearing during the race.  
Figure 22: Sample Result from Chicago 2019, a Personal Best 
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Figure 23: Sample Result from Chicago 2019 Including Shoe Data 
 
Source: strava.com/activities 
Figures 22 and 23 demonstrate the additional information that can be collected from an 
individual athlete’s activity. Useful pieces of data, such as whether or not the 
performance was a personal best for the athlete, can often be found in these activity 
pages. By combining these two rich data sources for each race, a dataset can be prepared 
for a variety of analyses.  
 Data Collection 
 Recognizing that the data exists and is publicly available is simple; collecting 
large amounts of that data in a way that will be conducive to econometric analysis is 
entirely more challenging. So, the next step in the process is building the dataset. With 
the goal of building a large dataset with tens of thousands of results, manual collection of 
any of this data is immediately ruled out. The entire process would need to be automated 
to be performed by a program script. Thus, Python programs are developed by taking 
inspiration from the Python scripts used in the Guinness scraping process and adjusted to 
handle the new scraping environments.  
 The first step in this scraping process is collecting the desired race results by 
visiting Strava race pages. The first challenge here is determining which races to scrape, 
and how to access those races’ race page on Strava’s website. At first glance, it appeared 
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that the URLs for race pages took the form of ‘strava.com/running_races/[RACE_ID#],’ 
where the RACE_ID# is some number generated by Strava that is meaningless other than 
being a unique identifier for a given race page. After further inspection, certain races 
have alternative URLs that take the following form: ‘strava.com/running_races/[YEAR]-
[RACENAME]’ (ex: https://www.strava.com/running_races/2014-Boston-Marathon). 
This format is more conducive to automating the scraping process, as this format would 
allow for compiling of a list of marathon race names and years, and simply iterate 
through those two lists to collect all of the race results from those courses and those 
years. For simplicity and to ensure comparable athlete levels, the list of races is restricted 
to the six World Marathon Majors: Boston, Chicago, New York, Tokyo, London and 
Berlin. Strava first started creating race pages for the 2014 Boston Marathon, so scraping 
starts with the year 2014 and goes through 2019, the latest year in which any of these 
marathons were run. Because some race pages are broken or missing, the final dataset 
includes a total of 30 races from those six marathons over the six-year time span, 2014-
2019.  
 From a technical perspective, a variety of Python packages are used to visit the 
race pages, scrape them for the appropriate data, and then store the data in a usable 
format. First, upon iterating over the list of races and years, the Python requests package 
was used to automate the visiting of a page and retrieval of the page’s HTML. Once on 
the results page, BeautifulSoup, another Python package, was used to inspect the HTML 
of the page and collect the desired information based on HTML tags. On each results 
page, such as the one displayed in Figure 21, all information available in the results table 
is collected: athlete name, athlete ID, activity name, activity ID, time, place, gender, and 
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age range. Because only 20 results are visible at a time on a race page, the program 
iterates through the results table until all results are collected or 2,000 results are 
collected, whichever comes first. The maximum number of results collected per page is 
capped a 2,000 for primarily practical and convenient reasons: if all results were 
collected, the dataset would balloon in size so much that collecting specific athlete data 
would be more arduous than it already is, as will be explained later. Once the 
BeautifulSoup package collects all of the relevant race page data by inspecting HTML 
tags, the data is stored in a Numpy array for saving in CSV format at the end of the 
scrape. After this first scrape of the 30 different race instances was complete, the dataset 
reaches a size of over 52,000 results, or about 1,700 per race.  
 Before moving to the next key stage of data collection, the dataset is reviewed. 
While a large dataset can provide for more compelling results after analysis, the vastness 
of the dataset poses practical challenges to the next stage in the data collection process. 
The first segment of collection featured visiting only 30 pages and collecting information 
from those pages, but the next segment entails visiting all 52,000+ activity pages for each 
athlete’s individual activity for a given race. Even though it is automated, scraping still 
takes time, so the dataset needs to be pared down. Thus, results are only kept for athletes 
that run at least two marathons in the present dataset; this allows for comparisons and 
analysis between races for the same athlete. After eliminating athletes with only one 
result in the dataset, there remain roughly 25,000 activities to scrape from just over 9,000 
athletes. Table 1, below, displays the number of results coming from each marathon each 
year and each race’s average time from their respective years. 
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Table 1: Race Year Result Count and Average Time 
 
 The next section of scraping is more difficult than the first. At first glance, 
because the activities are public records on Strava, it seems that the process is similar to 
the previous. However, after further investigation, it becomes clear that data on the shoes 
that the athlete wore during an activity is not available by simply visiting activity pages. 
While these pages are publicly accessible, the data of interest is hidden behind a log-in 
wall. For that reason, a logged-in browser would need to visit and scrape the pages. There 
are a variety of Python packages available that are capable of doing this; after playing 
around with packages like mechanize and robobrowser, MechanicalSoup proved to be the 
package of choice. This package combines the capability of mechanize, which allows for 
advanced page interaction, such as completing the authentication required in the log-in 
sequence, while also handling the HTML similarly to BeautifulSoup.  
 While a good solution to the problem of hidden data, MechanicalBrowser is not as 
fast or efficient as the simpler requests package. The process of logging in and then 
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navigating to pages from this page is very time consuming, and, once compounded with 
the need to visit 25,000 pages instead of just 30, completing this scrape becomes a multi-
day process. In addition to the slower visiting and scraping process, Strava’s site request 
limits prevent smooth scraping. A logged-in user is limited in the number of times they 
can make a request to the Strava servers in fixed time-frames; for example, Strava lists 
those limits to be 100 requests per hour and 1000 requests per day on their developers’ 
page. In order to expedite the process, four different Strava user accounts are used. 
Different methods were tested, such as scraping with all four accounts simultaneously on 
different computing machines, cycling between accounts and gaming the request limits. 
Finally, after about 5 days and well over 40 hours of scraping, the activity-specific data 
had been collected for the 25,451 race results in the dataset. Cross-sections of that 
scraped data are as follows in Figure 24. This data is not yet merged with the master 
result data, limiting the fields that are shown: 
 activity_id is the unique numerical identifier for a given Strava activity 
 shoes details the shoes an athlete wore, if reported; otherwise, ‘\xe2\x80\x94’ fills 
if value is blank 
 device reports the gear used to record an activity, such as a specific GPS watch; 
‘\xe2\x80\x94’ fills if value is blank 
 suffer records Strava’s heart rate-based measure of exertion; ‘\xe2\x80\x94’ fills if 
value is blank 
Figure 24: Sample of Scraped Strava Data 
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 With all of the appropriate data scraped and output into CSV files, the datasets are 
ready for cleaning and merging. Further Python scripts are used to clean up unfavorable 
formatting and unusual values in each dataset. An example of unusual values is any field 
that was filled with ‘\xe2\x80\x94,’ a placeholder for null values. The programs loaded 
the CSV data into Pandas data frames and then iterated over certain columns to clean data 
by stripping strings of UTF-8 encodings and converting strings to integers. Then, the 
program generates new variables that are important for later analysis by manipulating the 
given cleaned data. Most notably, the program creates the vaporfly variable by iterating 
through the shoes variable from the activity dataset and searching that string for sub-
strings such as “4%,” “Vaporfly,” “NEXT%,” or “Alphafly,” all used in the naming of 
the shoe, and giving value 1 where present or 0 where not. Other variable generation 
based on the existing dataset included values for race, year, and raceYear, 
selfReported_PR and strava_PR, and z1suffer. The race, year and raceYear variables 
capture the course the result was run on, the year in which the result was run, and the 
interaction of those two terms race * year, respectively. The selfReported_PR variable is 
generated based on any indication by an athlete in their activity title that the race was a 
personal record, while the strava_PR variable takes the value 1 for the races that are an 
athlete’s best performance in the dataset and 0 otherwise. The z1suffer variable is a 
standardization of the suffer score variable around its mean, after unusually high or low 
values are dropped to avoid any bias due to outliers. This standardization is performed by 
subtracting the mean of suffer from each instance of suffer and then dividing that value 
by suffer’s standard deviation. Ultimately, the dataset has missing values in places where 
athletes did not report certain pieces of information, such as the shoes they wore or their 
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average heart rate. Those missing values are left blank in the dataset, and then handled at 
time of analysis. Finally, after each of the two datasets are cleaned, they are merged by 
matching activity data to results data based on the activityID listed in both datasets. A 
sample of the final dataset follows in Figure 25. 
Figure 25: Sample of Final Dataset, with a Variety of Shoes & some Missing Values 
 
This cross-section of the final merged dataset shows a number of performances from 
athletes named Adrian. One can see how certain fields, such as shoes and suffer, are 
recorded in some activities and left null in others. This cross-section also features 
multiple performances in which athletes run their fastest time in the dataset while 
wearing the Vaporflys.  
 Data Description 
 The dataset is made up of 25,451 unique results run by 9,633 unique athletes. 
Males make up the majority of the race results, accounting for 22,151 of the results, or 
just over 90% of the dataset. The Boston Marathon is the most popular race in the dataset, 
accounting for 26.33% of results; Berlin, Chicago, New York City and Chicago all 
represent similar shares in the 15-20% range, while Tokyo accounts for only 3.56% of the 
results in the dataset, reflecting not the actual size of the race, but the adoption of Strava 
among finishers at Tokyo. Additionally, the majority of results come from athletes that 
land in the 35-44 age group, making up 9,288 of the dataset, as shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26: Results by Age Group & Gender 
 
The average result for men in the dataset is 3:05:31, while for women the mean is 
3:20:57. More interesting, though, is how those results have progressed over time in the 
dataset.  
Figure 27: Average Time by Course and Year 
 
Figure 27, above, depicts the trends in result times by race and year. These line graphs 
clearly show that times have gotten faster in the dataset over the 2014-2019 range. This 
trend breaks with the trend seen in the Guinness et. al. replication, where there were no 
noticeable trends in average time. Table 2, below, presents a more detailed view of how 
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these results change over time in the dataset, along with Vaporfly adoption and change in 
suffer score over time. 
Table 2: Average Time, Vaporfly Adoption and Suffer Score by Gender and Year 
 
As the above table demonstrates, for both men and women, the average result is faster 
year over year from 2014 to 2019. The number of results in a given year, does not follow 
the same trend; while 2014 has the lowest number of results for both genders, the number 
of results varies widely by year after that. This variation in number of results could be 
attributed to certain popular marathons, such as New York City and London, not having 
2016 or 2017 results pages on Strava, respectively. However, Strava, a relatively new 
platform, has seen massive growth over that same time frame, adding millions of users in 
that date range. Thus, one might hypothesize that the downward trend in average result 
has to do with the collection method; because only the top 2,000 results are collected 
from each race, an increase in results reported on Strava per race would likely cause the 
top 2,000 results to get faster each year. Similarly, athletes’ suffer scores, a measure of 
heart rate, has been trending downward through the dataset, likely a trend induced 
similarly by the collection method. Thus, this collection method could introduce a certain 
degree of selection bias to the analysis. When analyzing results, these general upload 
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trends on Strava’s platform needs to be handled so that selection bias does not impact 
estimates of the Vaporfly effect. 
Despite the concerns surrounding selection bias, Table 2 presents intriguing 
trends with respect to marathon times and suffer scores. In Figure 28, potential 
relationship between time, suffer score and the Vaporflys is explored by gender. 
Figure 28: Suffer Score vs Time by Gender & Vaporfly 
 
In this scatterplot, a few interesting trends appear. Not surprisingly, athletes with lower 
suffer scores are generally running faster than runners with higher suffer scores; suffer 
score increases with time and vice versa. More interestingly, though, is the fact that 
nearly all results, male or female, by a runner in Vaporflys are aggregated around both 
lower suffer scores and faster times. This trend has complicated implications. If the suffer 
score is used as a measure of fitness, does this trend then imply that fitter athletes are also 
wearing Vaporflys, or does it imply that the Vaporflys result in lower exertion, as 
represented by the suffer score? This figure is a first look at potential complications that 
could be associated with findings later on. 
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In addition to demonstrating trends in results, Table 2 gives insight to adoption of 
the Vaporflys over time. Figure 29, below, demonstrates how adoption of the shoe among 
runners in the dataset has been increasing quickly over time. By 2019, nearly 20% of 
runners in the dataset are using the Vaporflys in their race. 
Figure 29: Vaporfly Adoption over Time 
 
As expected, the fraction of runners wearing Vaporflys is 0 before their release in 2017. 
Subsequently, the fraction of adopters of the shoes increases each year, with both men 
and women starting with about 1.5% adoption in 2017 results, increasing all the way to 
over 16% of female results in 2019 and nearly 20% of male results in 2019. This trend 
mirrors the trend among elites in the Guinness study, showing that amateurs are also 
shifting towards the shoe in greater numbers each year.  
Men wearing the Vaporflys ran 15 minutes faster on average than men who did 
not wear Vaporflys, and women wearing the shoes averaged 22 minutes faster than their 
counterparts who did not wear the shoes. However, those averages do not account for 
time trends of results in the dataset; times are trending faster in the dataset even before 
the release of the Vaporflys. Thus, Figure 30 shines light on how this trend and the 
Vaporfly effect can potentially be unified:  
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Figure 30: Results Trends by Vaporfly & Gender 
 
Figure 30 demonstrates how times in our dataset improve for both Vaporfly-wearers and 
those who are not wearing the shoes. Interestingly, Vaporfly-wearers’ results converge 
with non-wearers’ results for women, calling into question the Vaporfly effect. 
Meanwhile, for men, the results trends for wearers and non-wearers of the Vaporflys are 
nearly parallel. The advantage for the wearers of the shoes remains nearly constant over 
time, building a graphical case for a Vaporfly effect. While these simple summary 
statistics are certainly suggestive of the Vaporflys providing a measurable advantage in 
race performance, they should be interpreted as nothing more than just that, suggestions.  
 Methodology & Approach 
 With the bulk of the data collected, processed, and merged into clean datasets and 
exploratory analysis complete, estimating the Vaporfly effect becomes a question of the 
strength of econometric analysis. While in the Guinness replication the goal was to 
directly recreate the analysis presented in their paper, the goal of the Strava analysis will 
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be to iterate through a variety of model specifications, building each model on the last, 
justifying each added feature.  
At a high level, our models for analyzing the Strava data will have two primary 
forms that are then split by gender, creating a total of four total models that will be run 
for any subsequent specification: 
 Data Split #1: timeMin vs logTime 
Those two forms will be an untransformed regression analysis, in which 
the dependent variable, timeMin, or marathon time in minutes, is left 
untransformed, and a log-transformed regression analysis, in which timeMin is 
converted to logTime by taking the natural log of all of the results in the dataset. 
The logTime dependent variable is of primary interest in this case because the 
regression analysis will subsequently yield coefficients that estimate the 
percentage change in time attributed to each explanatory variable in the model. 
Estimating these outcomes in percentage format then allows for a meaningful 
comparison with Nike’s claim that the shoes will make an athlete 4% faster.  
Data Split #2: Gender 
The models are then split by gender, male or female. This is done for a 
variety of reasons but, most prominently, because other studies of the shoes have 
handled gender similarly; other studies have found measurable differences in the 
Vaporfly effect by gender, and being able to compare the results found here to 
other studies is valuable.  
The basis for this regression analysis is relatively simple: a simple linear regression with 
logTime or timeMin as the dependent variable and vaporfly as the primary explanatory 
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variable of interest. As a result, the vaporfly variable’s coefficient estimated in the 
regression analysis will ultimately be the estimated effect of wearing the shoes, or the 
Vaporfly effect, controlling for everything else in the model. 
The first iteration on the base model is a relatively simple multi-linear regression, 
using z-score standardized suffer scores as a second explanatory variable, as follows: 
logTime = b0 + b1*vaporfly + b2*z1suffer + e 
By adding the standardized suffer score variable as an explanatory variable, changes in 
marathon times are explained by a proxy for that athlete’s fitness at the time of the race. 
The heart rate data variable, suffer, provides an estimate of fitness level because we 
expect that a runner that completes a run at a lower heart rate has a higher fitness level 
than a runner that completes the run with a higher heart rate. Because not all athletes on 
Strava report their heart rate data in their activity, including this variable restricts the 
dataset. This variable is standardized in this model in an attempt to assign more 
explanatory power to the variable. Now centered around 0 with standard deviation of 1, 
any z1suffer that is less than 0 represents activities with lower average heart rates and 
thus lower exertion, while values greater than 0 implies greater exertion. While reducing 
the number of observations when included in the model, this method adds a second 
meaningful explanatory variable, a benefit that might outweigh the cost of reducing the 
dataset in size. Figure 31 presents trends in the reporting of suffer score as well as the 
measure of the standardized suffer variable, z1suffer, over time. The suffer score variable 
has followed interesting trends over time in the dataset. Reporting over the variable has 
increased over time, from close to 15% in 2014 to over 30% in 2019, likely reflecting 
higher rates of heart rate monitor usage by athletes over time. 
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Figure 31: Average z1suffer & Fraction Reporting suffer 
 
This increase in reporting is accompanied by a decrease in suffer score in activities. This 
trend is cause for concern, as it may suggest that suffer scores are not decreasing because 
of improved fitness, but instead because more athletes have access to the heart rate 
monitor technology. For our z1suffer variable to have good explanatory power, it should 
not be correlated with the proportion of people reporting that measure, as that introduces 
a systematic bias to the variable. 
The restrictions of our dataset as a result of missing z1suffer values raise an 
important consideration in estimating the Vaporfly effect using the vaporfly variable as 
well. Like with heart rate data, not all athletes report the shoes they wore in their activity; 
for these activities, vaporfly is assigned a value of 0. However, it is possible that an 
athlete might wear the shoes but still not report it on Strava. Figure 32 displays the 
fraction of runners reporting the shoes they wore over time in the dataset. Year to year, 
activities reporting shoes varies between 41% and 45% with no visible trend in reporting. 
This recognition gives rise to another variation that will be useful to run on each 
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subsequent model specification. This potentially errant assumption can be avoided by 
restricting analysis to activities that are not missing reported shoes. 
Figure 32: Fraction of Activities Reporting Shoes 
 
While this restriction to the roughly 42% of activities in which shoes are reported reduces 
dataset to about 9,000 activities, potentially reducing the empirical explanatory power, it 
removes another potential source of bias in the estimates.  
 With those relatively simple variations on linear regressions formulated, now 
models can be developed that handle greater sources of bias through the use of fixed 
effects. Fixed effects are used to capture the average quality of a variable not explained 
by the rest of the model, so, by adding them to the trends in the linear regression models 
already built, the effects of those variables can be stripped from the estimate of the 
Vaporfly effect. Fixed effects will be used for three variables: athlete-specific effect, 
course-specific effect, and race-year-specific effect.  
 First, the athlete-specific effect can be used to set a baseline talent level for each 
athlete in the dataset, represented by the athlete_id variable. Estimating this fixed 
effect helps to differentiate outcomes that differ as a result of one athlete being 
naturally faster or more talented than another.  
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 Next, the course-specific fixed effect accounts for the average difficulty of a 
course. It is not necessarily fair to compare the New York City or Boston 
marathons, considered relatively hilly and challenging courses, to the flat and fast 
courses in Chicago or Berlin. This fixed effect accounts for those differences in 
difficult level and removes it from the estimated Vaporfly effect.  
 Finally, the race-year-specific fixed effect is used to control for the conditions on 
race day at a particular race. While this effect may seem trivial to some, the effect 
of weather on a performance should not be underestimated. Take the Boston 
Marathons run in 2018 and 2019, for example. In 2018, freezing rain and gusting 
wind produced two of the slowest winning times for the race in decades. 
Meanwhile, in 2019, results were as fast as ever on a perfectly sunny, mild 50-
degree day.  
A model controlling for each of these fixed effects might be presented as follows: 
logTime = b0 + b1*vaporfly + b2*z1suffer + (1|f1) + 1(|f2) + (1|f3) + e 
where f1, f2, and f3 are fixed effects captured by the athlete_id, race, and raceYear 
variables, respectively. With this more complex fixed effect model in place, all 
previously mentioned variations can also be run: including or excluding z1suffer, 
restricting to activities that reported shoes, using untransformed or log-transformed 











The primary goal of this analysis is any improvement, or effectively replication, upon 
Guinness’ results by way of adding more data to the dataset. The additional data in this 
dataset is the 2020 Marathon Project, a race run at the end of 2020 in order to give 
professional marathoners a chance to compete during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
results are as follows, separated by gender: 
Results 1: Guinness Improvement, Men 
 
Results 2: Guinness Improvement, Women 
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As the estimated coefficient on x1 indicates, this model produces a slightly stronger 
estimated Vaporfly effect for men than reported in the original Guinness et. al. study, 
while estimating a roughly equivalent effect for women. These differences are interesting 
nonetheless: the estimated effect for men is now a 2.18% performance boost, compared 
to 2.09% in the original analysis, and for women a 1.33% performance boost, compared 
to 1.35% in the original analysis. Despite the addition of new data from a highly 
competitive race, the estimates do not fluctuate much from the original analysis, further 
confirmation of Guinness et. al.’s estimate under the specified model. 
For men, this advantage represents an advantage of over three minutes in a 
marathon race, while for women the advantage is over two minutes, both sizable margins 
at the professional level. Most professional marathoners would be pleased with a 30 
second improvement on their personal best; these shoes promise the possibility of an 
improvement of over 4-6 times as strong. With a large number of observations for both 
the men and the women, and high t-values for each regression, the empirical value of 
each of these results is promising.  
 While these results seem more reasonable at face value than Nike’s claim of a 4% 
improvement, they still have holes with respect to omitted variable bias. While these 
models control well for a variety of fixed effects, they do not do as good of a job at 
accounting for any effect that might be attributed to improvement in fitness over time. 
While athlete-specific fixed effects control for an athlete’s general talent level, there are 
still fluctuations in how fit an athlete might be in any given performance. On one hand, a 
certain race result might be slower than an athlete would expect to run if he or she had 
been plagued by injuries during the training cycle. On the other hand, a result could also 
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represent a breakthrough performance after years of quality training. This model makes 
no attempt to control for either of those factors that could very easily sway the estimate 
for the Vaporfly effect. One might also hypothesize that the models also do not account 
for the effect that might be attributed to wearing a fresh pair of shoes, as Vaporflys are 
generally only worn for 3-4 races, as opposed to a pair of shoes that might have hundreds 
of miles of training on them, but we can assume that this effect is null in this analysis 
because the nature of professional contracts is such that athletes are able to wear a new 
pair of shoes in each passing race if they so choose; this assumption does not hold for 
amateurs, however. 
 Nonetheless, the results from this replication are still compelling. While the 
accuracy of the estimated effect is still up for debate, the existence of such an effect is 
reaffirmed. At such large scale, it seems hard to believe that the estimated effect can be 
attributed entirely to omitted variables. As such, the replication and improvement upon 
these results achieves the goal of setting a baseline estimate for the Vaporfly effect within 
the context of professional running.  
Strava Analysis 
Next, the analysis of Strava data seeks both to quantify the effects for a broader 
population of runners and to hone in further on the Vaporfly effect by controlling for 
omitted variable bias not controlled for in the Guinness analysis. As described in the 
methodology section, an iterative approach is used to achieve these goals, building 





Results 3: Strava Analysis, Men 
 
Results 4: Strava Analysis, Women 
 
 Model 1: Simple Multi-Linear Regression 
The first regression that attempts to quantify the effect is a relatively simply 
multilinear regression. The standardized suffer score variable is used as an explanatory 
variable to stand in for an athlete’s fitness during the race. As such, this regression 
concludes a 6.50% Vaporfly effect for men and 6.19% effect for women—sizable! These 
results should not be trusted though, as they fail to control for all of those athlete, course 
and race year specific fixed effects.  
Model 2: Simple Fixed Effects 
Next, controlling for the aforementioned fixed effects without including suffer 
score or excluding runners that did not report their shoes on their activities in the model 
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results in regression results with the highest number of observations for both men and 
women, 22,142 and 3,297, respectively. Upon controlling for the fixed effects, the 
estimated Vaporfly effect plummets for both men and women. These results now more 
closely mirror results seen in other studies, with the effect estimated at 2.70% for men 
and 1.73% for women. However, the goal is not simply to mirror other results, but to 
improve upon them.  
Model 3: Combining simple MLR with FE 
In order to further control for the fitness effect that the Guinness study failed to 
control, these two preliminary models are now combined by running a multi-linear 
regression with fixed effects. As one might expect, the combination of these two models 
drives down the estimate even further. Now, for men, the model estimates a 2.11% effect 
with strong statistical significance, while for women it estimates a 1.50% effect, a value 
that is called into question by a suspiciously high p-value of 0.132. This high p-value 
makes this estimate for the women’s Vaporfly effect untrustworthy. While this model is 
as advanced as the specification gets at this point, there still exist questions surrounding a 
variety of biases and uncertainties.  
Model 4: MLR & FE with no Missing Values 
In the next iteration on the model, any uncertainty caused by the tagging of the 
Vaporflys is addressed. Marking activities that did not include any report of shoes as 0, or 
not using Vaporflys, presents a clear source of bias; while one might anticipate that 
wearers of the Vaporflys would report their shoes, this assumption is weak and unproven. 
For that reason, in the next models, only activities that included the designation of the 
shoes worn in activity are included. By limiting the analysis to this subset of activities, 
 64 
the estimates are again changed, but in different directions for men and women, which 
also comes across as suspicious. For men, the effect is now estimated at 2.37% on the 
2,745 observations still in the model, an increase in estimated Vaporfly effect from the 
previous iteration despite the decrease in observations, still with strong statistical 
significance. Meanwhile, the women’s estimate drops all the way to a 0.61% effect with 
verry little statistical significance; this lack of statistical significance, represented by a 
very high p-value, could be due to the women’s sample size dropping down to just 166 
activities. Because the sample size is so shrunken, this estimate becomes even less 
relevant. Focusing on the estimate for men, however, provides an interesting result: when 
vaporfly is assigned with certainty based on non-missing values, the model now estimates 
a stronger Vaporfly effect.  
 Model 5: Fixed Effects with no Missing Values 
While model 4 seems the most advanced, combining an interesting multi-linear 
regression with meaningful fixed effects, there remain doubts surrounding the validity of 
heart rate data as a proxy for fitness. The assumption behind that proxy is that athletes 
with lower heart rates are fitter than others; this assumption is not perfect. For example, 
different athletes’s heart rates might simply respond differently to exertion levels. 
Additionally, the trends presented with respect to suffer score reporting and its value 
trends cause more concern for bias within that variable. This is not to say that this 
specification should be thrown out all together, but simply to say that it is worthy of some 
skepticism. For that reason, the following model is run leaving behind the z1suffer 
variable, but still requiring that the activity include the shoes the athlete wore on race 
day. Here, the model produces the strongest estimated Vaporfly effect yet under the fixed 
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effects model for men, coming in at 3.06% on 9,241 observations. The women’s result 
comes in at an estimated 1.52% effect on 949 observations, returning to being somewhat 
statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.05.  
For the men in particular these results are convincing. While these results fail to 
control for a fitness effect by way of heart rate data, they mirror well the analysis done by 
Guinness et. al. Despite losing some of the estimate’s explanatory power by eliminating 
the proxy for fitness, being able to compare these results directly with the Guinness et. al. 
results allows for a more interesting dialogue regarding how the shoes affect amateurs 
and professionals differently. Focusing just on the men in both sets of analysis, it appears 
that amateurs actually experience a greater effect from the shoes. The original Guinness 
et. al. analysis estimated a 2.09% effect and the improvement estimated a 2.18% effect; 
this analysis, using an identical empirical model, estimates a 3.06% effect, a jump of at 
least 0.88%, if not closer to 1%. This difference in effect between elites and competitive 
amateurs raises plenty of fascinating hypotheses. It is possible that the shoes make a 
greater difference for amateurs because amateurs are naturally less efficient than 
professionals, resulting in greater efficiency gains from the shoes’ mechanisms. 
Alternatively, the difference in effect could be something like a placebo effect for 
amateurs: perhaps amateurs believe that the effect exists more than professionals do. 
These suggestions are only hypotheses, though, and would require further analysis in 
order to prove.  
Implications 
While many of these results have their statistical and comparative significances, 
the practical significance surrounding the estimates is drawn from real world 
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implications. The implications are manifold; these results carry one meaning for athletes, 
another for the shoe industry, and an entirely different meaning for econometricians.  
First and foremost, these results are game changing for athletes, for better in some 
instances, and for worse in others. For amateur athletes, these results should be exciting. 
Depending on a male amateur’s pace during his marathon, this improvement of 3.06% 
translates to a sizable time jump; for example, if an athlete believes he can run 6:00/mile 
without the shoes, this suggests to him that the shoes would enable him to run 5:50/mile 
with the Vaporflys on. That represents a jump from a 2:37:19 marathon to a 2:32:57 
marathon, a difference of over four minutes. For the competitive amateur, that personal 
best becomes even more impressive. A less trivial example comes for the average male 
runner in the Strava dataset. That runner runs around 3:02 for the marathon, narrowly 
missing the qualifying window for the Boston Marathon, a major milestone for many 
runners. By putting on the Vaporflys, that runner could expect to run 2:56 instead, safely 
securing him a spot at Boston. For many, qualifying for Boston is a major achievement, 
and these shoes could give some runners the edge they need to make that dream a reality.  
For the elites, though, the Vaporfly effect has mixed implications. On one hand, 
this technology is clearly pushing the sport forward. A marathon was run in under 2 hours 
for the first time ever in these shoes, breaking a barrier previously thought of as 
unbreakable. Despite marathon times at or below 2:05 having been run many times since 
Khalid Khannouchi set the world record in London in 2002, some professionals, and even 
scientists, had hypothesized that 2 hours was the magical barrier that humans would 
never cross. In October 2019, Eliud Kipchoge broke that barrier wearing the Vaporflys, 
reminding us through the process that “no human is limited.” Additionally, professionals, 
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just like amateurs, would all like to boast of fast personal records as possible, even if 
advanced technology is necessary to achieve it. On the other hand, however, comes the 
question of unfairness in the sport, a hot topic of debate within the professional running 
world at the moment. While pushing the sport forward is great, leaving athletes behind 
who cannot access the technology is not perceived as fair. Many professionals are 
restricted in their shoe choices by the shoe company they sign contracts with, so non-
Nike runners are left at a disadvantage as long as the shoes are present. With the 
advantage evidently present and sizable, this technology seems to complicate the elite 
competition. 
While Nike’s shoes create this advantage at present, this advantage only exists so 
long as other shoe companies do not release equally, or greater, as effective of shoes. 
Thus, while there are questions surrounding the fairness of the Vaporfly, the effectiveness 
of the shoes also incites competition from other brands of running shoes. Other 
companies, such as New Balance and Hoka One One, have subsequently come out with 
their own ‘super shoes’ that are designed similarly in order to compete with Nike. In a 
sense, Nike has pushed the entire industry forward, with other companies following the 
path that they have created. The hope is that this competition between brands will 
ultimately eliminate any unfairness in the sport and continue to push the shoe technology 
forward. It is paramount that, if the sport is to be pushed forward from a technological 
perspective, that it be done equitably. We would rather see competition between 
individuals at the World Marathon Majors and the Olympic Marathon than see 
competition between two brands and their technology. 
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Finally, these results have minor implications for econometricians as well. As the 
research currently stands, this work is a case study in the difficulty of handling omitted 
variable bias. While attempts are made through both fixed effects and the fitness proxy 
variable, z1suffer, to control for the omitted variable of an athlete’s fitness level, these 
attempts are not perfect, nor entirely successful. These attempts leave any good 
economist wanting a more compelling argument for how they effectively control for the 
bias. This difficulty also demonstrates a challenge in doing retrospective research this 
way: extensive data collection and analysis can be done, but if omitted variable bias is 
present, it might still taint the results. While there are still opportunities to try to handle 


















 Nike might be overconfident in their promise, but the data indicates that the 
Vaporflys will make you run faster. The results found in this study are strongly 
suggestive of a Vaporfly effect both existing and being practically significant. While 
confirming the magnitude of the effect with certainty is tempting, as the effect repeatedly 
appears in the data after rounds of analysis, the remaining questions regarding sources of 
bias make this claim somewhat dubious. Regardless, though, the results here suggest that 
Nike is overselling their promise that these shoes will make you 4% faster. This tagline is 
perhaps most relevant to competitive amateur male runners, as they saw the strongest 
effect, estimated at 3.1%, while all other types of runners (elite men and women, amateur 
women) in the dataset saw effects ranging from 1.3% to 2.2%. So, while the shoes will 
certainly help a runner set a personal best and run faster than they might otherwise be 
able to, Nike should revisit their claim.  
 This work, and all work studying the Vaporflys, is not yet complete. There remain 
plenty of areas for improvement in both the general study of the shoes and in the 
approach taken here. The best way to determine whether or not the effect really exists is 
to recruit people to a randomized control trial. Such a study might look something like 
this: recruit a number of people to run two marathons in a relatively short time window 
and randomly assign half of them the Vaporflys in the second marathon while the other 
half uses the same model of shoe they wore in the first half. The shoes worn in the first 
half of the study, as well as the second half for the control group, might look and vaguely 
feel like Vaporflys, perhaps just lacking the carbon fiber plate and the high-tech foam. 
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While there are plenty of areas for complications in that setup, such as athlete attrition or 
injury, it seems achievable. Unfortunately, though, the only company that would likely 
have the funding to secure such a study would be Nike itself, and Nike has no incentive 
to prove that their shoes make athletes any less than 4% faster.  
With a randomized control trial off the table, retroactive studies like this one and 
the study put forth by Guinness et. al. are the best options for studying the Vaporfly effect 
at present. These studies could be improved upon in a multitude of ways. 
Area for Improvement #1: More Data 
Focusing on this study, one simple improvement would be to collect more data 
from the races that are being studied, prior to even expanding to other races. This study 
limited results collection to the top 2,000 times in each race reported on Strava’s race 
pages, a method that was deficient in a at least two ways: first, this method heavily biased 
results towards men, leaving us with few women to study, and second, this approach 
resulted in fundamentally different cross-sections of the runners in each subsequent race, 
as athletes’ posting of their results on Strava has been increasing over time. Removing 
that results limit would not only create a more representative cross-sample of the results, 
but would also increase the overall sample size, improving explanatory power. Starting 
with over 25,000 results, improving sample size did not seem like seem like a high 
priority until it became clear that only about one-third of athletes report the shoes that 
they wear, a piece of data that is clearly essential to the analysis.  
Area for Improvement #2: Model Improvements 
In addition to data collection improvements, there are a variety of model 
improvements and variations to be made. The glaring omission of this study is the failure 
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to adequately handle for omitted variable bias. There are a couple of methods that might 
help handle the bias. First, no attempt was made in this study to use instrumental 
variables to handle the omitted variable bias, despite instrumental variables being the 
classic econometric way of handling it. While I do not have suggestions for how to use 
instrumental variables in this context, they are worth considering for future work. Then, 
for using proxy variables as a substitute for the omitted variable of fitness level, using a 
recent marathon time for each runner as a measure of fitness could also suffice. While 
this measure might have its own flaws, this proxy for fitness would tell a more 
convincing story of how omitted variable bias was handled in analysis, resulting in more 
compelling estimates. 
Areas for Improvement #3: Expanded Focus 
Continuations of this study could also go on to tackle more specific questions 
about the Vaporfly effect. The study from the New York Times put forth a variety of 
interesting estimates that would be worthwhile. For example, focusing more specifically 
on the effect that the shoes had when an athlete switches from another pair of shoes 
would be an interesting advancement that is possible within the current dataset. 
Additionally, building on the model that estimated the likelihood of setting a personal 
best while wearing the shoes would perhaps be the most relevant model for most runners; 
many runners might be convinced of the existence of an effect if the shoes could promise 
a personal best. Further, their studies also involved comparisons between the Vaporflys 
and other shoes. Comparing the effect that the Vaporflys have specifically with the effect 
of the other ‘super shoes’ that emerge, such as the Hoka One One Carbon X and the New 
Balance Fuel Cell, would become the most meaningful comparisons to make. As the 
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competition between these shoe companies continue, consumers will need to do cost-
benefit analyses of each of the shoes, comparing each shoe by a weighted average of their 
performance effect and their price point. Being able to assign performance effects to each 
of the shoes would be crucial in consumers’ selection of the shoe that is right for them.  
Even still, the Vaporfly effect is real and measurable, as this study has shown. 
The results found in this study convinced me to buy a pair of the shoes. While I have only 
worn the shoes a handful of times, the Vaporflys have already enabled me to complete 
runs I previously thought impossible. In a training run, I set a massive half marathon 
personal best in a controlled 14-mile effort. When running in the shoes, particularly when 
running at a moderate to hard effort, I felt like I was wearing springs on my feet. The 
uphills felt shorter and less intense and the downhills did not damage my legs as much as 
they normally would. Then, in the 2021 Providence Marathon, I debuted at the distance 
with a 2:38 performance.  
 
Author (Will Peters) in the 2021 Providence Marathon wearing Nike Alphafly NEXT%’s 
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Through a rolling course on a sunny and warm day, sub-optimal conditions for a 
marathon, I ran faster than I had hoped months ago at the start of the training cycle. 
When the going got difficult late in the race, the shoes seemingly did the running for me, 
keeping me from completely imploding despite hamstring cramps and dehydration. By 
putting the shoes on and testing them for myself, I became even more convinced that they 
produce the promised effect. However, I am also currently in the best shape of my life 
without the shoes on, having also done some training runs in other shoes that were 
previously unimaginable. While I would like to attribute my breakthrough performances 
to the shoes for the sake of this study, I would be remiss to not take some of the credit 
myself after all of the hard work that went into this training cycle. 
Again, we are left wondering how much of the effect can be attributed to the 
shoes, and how much comes from somewhere else. Has Nike innovated in a way that has 
truly changed the landscape of running, or are we simply misattributing advancements in 
the sport to technology instead of improved athletic ability? The short, unsatisfying, 
answer is that we are not yet sure; it seems like it might be a little bit of both. Even with 
the empirical results presented in this study, skepticism of the shoes is still valid. Either 
way, though, it is an exciting time to be an athlete, spectator, economist or consumer in 
this space. With or without the shoes, let barriers be broken, innovation be made and 





Full list of marathons used in Guinness et. al. analysis and replication: 
 Women's US Olympic Trials Marathon 2020 
 Men's US Olympic Trials Marathon 2020 
 The Marathon Project 2020 (replication only) 
 Grandma's Marathon (2015-2019) 
 New York City Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Chicago Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Houston Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Cal Intl Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Boston Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Twin Cities Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Philadelphia Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Indianapolis Mon Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Toronto Waterfront Marathon (2015-2019) 
 LA Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Richmond Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Eugene Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Phoenix Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Marine Corps Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Vancouver Intl Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Ottawa Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Columbus Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Lakefront Marathon (2015-2019) 
 Wineglass Marathon (2015-2019) 
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